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THE NEW INTRUSION TORT: THE 
NEWS MEDIA EXPOSED? 
Thomas Levy McKenzie* 
In C v Holland, Whata J recognised that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion formed part of New 
Zealand's common law. The tort protects against intentional intrusions into a person's private 
space. This decision potentially exposes the news media to tortious liability when it engages in 
intrusive newsgathering practices. However, Whata J's decision provides little guidance as to how 
the tort should be applied in later cases. In order to ascertain the meaning of the tort's formulation, 
this article draws upon the methods used, both in New Zealand and internationally, to prevent the 
news media from breaching individual privacy rights. It then suggests that the courts should replace 
the formulation with a one-step reasonable expectation of privacy test. It also argues that the 
legitimate public concern defence should be better tailored to the intrusion context. Finally, it 
briefly assesses how the intrusion tort should interact with the privacy tort in Hosking v Runting. 
Ultimately, it concludes that, in future, the courts should reflect more carefully on the precise 
wording of the intrusion tort's formulation so that it best vindicates the interests that it was designed 
to protect.  
I INTRODUCTION 
C lived in a house with her boyfriend, Z, and Mr Holland. One day, while borrowing Mr 
Holland's laptop to watch movies, Z found a video file on the laptop with C's nickname as the title. 
He tried to access the file, but the link was missing. Z waited until Mr Holland had left the house to 
search Mr Holland's hard-drive for the file of the same name. Z discovered that Mr Holland had 
installed a video camera in the roof cavity in their bathroom. Mr Holland had been surreptitiously 
filming C while she showered. The police charged Mr Holland for making an intimate visual 
recording.1 Mr Holland pleaded guilty, was convicted, had to pay $1000 in reparation and was 
discharged without penalty.2 
  
*  Article submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. The author 
would like to thank Dr Nicole Moreham for her very helpful comments.  
1  Under the Crimes Act 1961, s 216H. 
2  The above facts are detailed in C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672 at [2]. 
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C, still distressed about the filming, brought proceedings against Mr Holland in tort for invasion 
of privacy. Previous case law had permitted a person to succeed in such a claim only where there 
was publication of private facts.3 Mr Holland had not shown the movie file to anybody else.4 The 
High Court was faced with a unique issue: can a person have an actionable claim in tort for breach 
of privacy where there is no publication of private facts? In essence, Whata J was required to decide 
whether the tort of intrusion upon seclusion forms part of the law of New Zealand. He held that it 
did.5  
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion provides a cause of action against those who intrude upon a 
person's private space without publishing any information gathered from the intrusion. Thus, Whata 
J's decision affects a number of entities, including the news media. Prior to his decision, the news 
media could only be liable in tort where it published private facts about the plaintiff. Liability risk 
became an issue only at the point of publication. Following C v Holland (Holland), the news media 
can be held liable at the point of newsgathering where intrusive methods are used. This might have a 
chilling effect on newsgathering activities. 
This article will evaluate how the tort of intrusion upon seclusion should develop in order to 
strike a balance between the protection of individual privacy rights and the news media's ability to 
freely engage in newsgathering activities. It will do this, first, by discussing the policy justifications 
for the tort. Secondly, it will analyse Whata J's formulation of the tort and suggest how it should be 
developed. It will then recommend how the intrusion tort should interact with the existing tort of 
publicity given to private facts. Much of this analysis involves discussion of the news media. For the 
purposes of this article, "news media" means entities whose publishing activities involve a 
significant element of aggregation of news, information and opinion of current value, which is then 
disseminated to a public audience on a regular basis.6  
II POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INTRUSION TORT 
The intrusion tort protects against interferences with an individual's private space. It can be 
distinguished from the publicity tort, which concerns dissemination of private information about a 
person. Often, the news media will have to interfere with such an individual's private space in order 
to gather news. Newsgathering is therefore intimately connected to the publication of stories that are 
of legitimate interest to the public in a free and democratic society. It follows that tortious liability 
for such intrusions has the ability to hinder investigative journalism that exposes serious 
  
3   Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at [118]. 
4  C v Holland, above n 2, at [2]. 
5  C v Holland, above n 2, at [93]. 
6  This definition is adapted from the definition of the news media provided by the Law Commission in Law 
Commission The News Media Meets 'New Media': Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in a Digital Age 
(NZLC R 128, 2013) at [44]. 
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wrongdoing. Any limitation on newsgathering must be justified. It is important, then, that any 
interference with those activities is clearly justified. This section sets out how the intrusion tort 
upholds the traditional values that justify legal protection of individual privacy.  
The tort established in Holland protects individual dignity. An intruder who breaches another 
person's privacy interferes with that person's dignity in two ways. First, the intruder is disregarding 
the person's ability to choose which aspects of the person's life are to be kept private, which in turn 
suggests the person’s choices do not merit respect, and undermines the person's sense of self-
worth.7 Secondly, the intruder is ignoring the probable effect that the intrusion will have on the 
person's emotional wellbeing.8 So, when a tabloid publishes private information about an individual, 
the tabloid is placing its desire to publish above the individual's want for privacy, knowing full well 
that the individual may suffer emotional distress as a result.9 Or, in the context of a physical 
intrusion, when a peeping-tom watches a person getting undressed, he is placing his choice to peep 
above the person's desire to get changed in private, while ignoring that the person might feel 
violated as a consequence.10 To provide a remedy in tort for the tabloid's actions while not 
providing one for the peeping-tom's actions would fail to uphold this dignity value.  
Privacy also advances individual autonomy. Autonomy is the power to make and exercise 
independent moral judgement, even when such judgement is not a popular one.11 Individuals choose 
how they wish to present themselves to society in part to avoid the adverse judgement of others.12 
When individuals retreat from society to their own private space, they are safe to develop their own 
thoughts and engage in certain behaviours without fear that they will be judged or persecuted for 
behaving in that way.13 Thus, when a peeping-tom observes people without their knowledge, the 
peeping-tom is taking away those individuals' freedom to decide how they present themselves to 
others.14 It follows that, when individuals suspect or find out that somebody is watching them, it 
  
7  Nicole Moreham "Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of the New Zealand 
Breach of Privacy Tort" in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) Law, Liberty, Legislation (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2008) 231 at 236. 
8  Moreham, above n 7, at 237. 
9  Chris DL Hunt "Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational Considerations for 
the Development of Canada's Fledgling Privacy Tort" (2011) 37 Queen's LJ 167 at 204. 
10  Hunt, above n 9, at 204. 
11  Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421 at 449. 
12  Hunt, above n 9, at 206. 
13  Gavison, above n 11, at 448. 
14  Hunt, above n 9, at 206. 
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stifles their ability to exercise autonomy because they do not feel safe behaving in a way that might 
attract public scorn.15 
The advancement of autonomy is necessary in order to safeguard freedom of expression. People 
do not like being publicly judged for their failures. An individual therefore needs to be insulated 
from ridicule and censure in early stages of experimentation. Thus, if individuals feel that they are 
under constant surveillance while testing a radical or new idea, they might be too afraid of 
persecution to engage in learning, creation or questioning.16 Similarly, individuals are less likely to 
engage freely in communications with others where they think such conversations are being 
intercepted in an intrusive manner, for example where those individuals' phones are being tapped, or 
where their conversations are recorded through directional microphones. This also facilitates 
freedom of expression.17 
Also linked to the autonomy value is the preservation of mental wellbeing. When individuals 
fail to conduct themselves in accordance with society's behavioural norms, they might be 
disapproved of, gossiped about or even shunned by their communities.18 The ability to retreat to a 
private sphere removes pressure to constantly conform with societal norms, encourages emotional 
release and ultimately allows the individual to relax.19 If this sphere is not protected, and individuals 
are subject to intrusive surveillance, they might become repressed, alienated, inhibited and suffer 
from a mental breakdown as a result of not being able to discard the image of themselves that they 
project publicly.20  
III HOW SHOULD THE COURTS DEVELOP WHATA J'S 
FORMULATION? 
The purpose of this article is not to analyse whether Whata J was correct in finding that the tort 
of intrusion upon seclusion was a logical and necessary extension of the privacy tort in Hosking v 
Runting. Whata J's rigorous analysis of this question provides a powerful case for the tort's 
existence. Instead, this article seeks to undertake a careful, contextualised deconstruction of the 
  
15  Hunt, above n 9, at 207. 
16  Gavison, above n 11, at 448. 
17  Nicole Moreham "Privacy Rights" in Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie (eds) Tugendhat & 
Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 59 at [2.61]. 
See also the discussion in the United States Supreme Court case of Bartnicki v Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) at 
542 where Rehnquist CJ, in his dissenting judgment, argued that allowing media defendants to escape 
liability for illegally intercepting phone conversations would have a chilling effect on the free speech of 
millions of people who rely on electronic technology to communicate. 
18  Hunt, above n 9, at 210. 
19  Hunt, above n 9, at 211. 
20  Gavison, above n 11, at 448. 
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requirements of Whata J's intrusion action. Since Mr Holland's behaviour so obviously triggered 
liability in Holland itself, this aspect of the action required less rigorous attention from Whata J. It 
will, however, be very important to the future direction of this new cause of action. 
This article will now turn to discuss how the courts should develop Whata J's formulation. The 
policy justifications for guarding against intrusions upon a person's seclusion discussed in the 
previous section of this article will be used to inform the central inquiry into the appropriateness of 
the tort's four requirements. After all, the tort should develop in a way that furthers the policy that 
underlies it.  
A The Formulation 
A successful claim under Whata J's formulation requires:21 
(a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs); 
(c) Involving an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
Whata J suggests that a legitimate public concern in the information might provide a defence to 
a claim in intrusion.22 Further, although he did not expressly say so, "information" appears to refer 
to the information gathered as a result of the intrusive act.  
This formulation was not developed in a vacuum. Whata J drew upon a number of New Zealand 
and international sources to inform his test. His starting point was the leading New Zealand Court of 
Appeal decision on breach of privacy, Hosking v Runting (Hosking).23 In this decision, a majority of 
the Court held that the wrongful publication of private facts was an actionable common law tort if 
the plaintiff could show:24 
(1) The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; and 
(2) Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person. 
  
21  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
22  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
23  In Hosking v Runting, above n 3, the plaintiffs were a celebrity couple who sued a magazine in order to 
prevent the publication of photos taken of their twin daughters on a busy public street. The plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful because the photographs published were not "private facts" in which there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
24  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [117]. 
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A legitimate public concern in the information is a defence to any claim.25 Whata J considered that 
the intrusion tort should develop in line with the existing Hosking tort.26 The "reasonable 
expectation of privacy", "highly offensive" and "legitimate public concern" elements of Whata J's 
formulation are taken directly from the Hosking test.  
Whata J also believed that his formulation should maintain as much consistency as possible with 
the relevant North American authorities.27 In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(Restatement) divides the right to privacy into four separate torts,28 one of which protects against 
intrusions:29 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
Jones v Tsige (Jones), a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, incorporated the United 
States' intrusion tort into the Canadian common law.30 Jones summarises the elements of the United 
States tort as:31  
(1) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion;  
(2) That intrusion was highly offensive to the reasonable person;  
(3)  The matter intruded on was private; and 
(4) The intrusion caused anguish and suffering.  
Whata J's formulation adopts all these elements, except for "anguish and suffering" because he 
considered that element to be more relevant to the assessment of damages.32  
In addition to the New Zealand and North American common law, Whata J found support for 
his new tort in New Zealand legislation that protects against unreasonable intrusions. He did this to 
  
25  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [134]. 
26  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
27  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
28  This is discussed at C v Holland, above n 2, at [13]–[14]. See also American Law Institute Restatement of 
Torts (2nd ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 1977) § 652A [Restatement]. The text of the Restatement can be found at 
Appendix 4.  
29  Restatement, above n 28, § 652B. 
30  Jones v Tsige [2012] ONCA 32, (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241. 
31  See discussion in C v Holland, above n 2, at [15], referring to Jones v Tsige, above n 30, at [56].  
32  C v Holland, above n 2, at [18]. 
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show that Parliament accepts that individuals have the right to be free from intrusions into their 
private space in certain situations.33 While Whata J did not directly rely on privacy legislation to 
come up with his formulation, the courts should aim to develop the tort so that it is consistent with 
the existing legislation.  
One example of legislative protection against intrusion is found in the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
This Act gives the Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA) authority to deal with complaints 
against the broadcast media where the media breaches an individual's privacy. The BSA can award 
damages where a breach has occurred.34 These complaints are judged against the BSA's Privacy 
Principles including Privacy Principle 335 which provides that a broadcaster will be in breach if it 
publicly discloses material obtained through an intentional interference with an individual's interest 
in seclusion in a way that is highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.36 A person will 
generally not have an interest in seclusion when they are in a public place,37 but this public place 
exemption does not apply when the individual is particularly vulnerable and the disclosure is highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.38 BSA Privacy Principle 839 also provides a public 
interest defence to defendants akin to that in the Hosking tort where the matter disclosed is of 
legitimate public concern.40 
Another example of legislative protection is found in the Privacy Act 1993. Whata J referred to 
Principle 4(b)(i) of the Act, which prevents an "agency" from collecting information through means 
that intrude upon an individual's personal affairs to an unreasonable extent.41 If information is 
collected in a way that breaches this principle, a complaint can be brought before the Privacy 
Commissioner.42 Although exemptions to the Privacy Act limit its utility,43 the Act is useful to help 
  
33  C v Holland, above n 2, at [22]. 
34  However, the maximum compensation that can be awarded for a successful complaint is $5,000. For further 
information see John Burrows and Ursula Cheer (eds) Media Law in New Zealand (6th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, LexisNexis, 2010) at 350. 
35  For the text of Privacy Principle 3, see Appendix 1 and Broadcasting Standards Authority "Privacy 
Principles" (2012) <www.bsa.govt.nz>. 
36  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(1). 
37  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(2). 
38  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3). 
39  For the text of Privacy Principle 8, see Appendix 1 and Broadcasting Standards Authority, above n 35. 
40  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 8. 
41  Privacy Act 1993, s 6. 
42  Privacy Commissioner "Manner of Collection of Personal Information (principle four)" 
<www.privacy.org.nz>. 
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ascertain the policy considerations that Parliament wishes to advance with respect to the protection 
of privacy.44 
One further piece of legislation, to which Whata J referred, is Part 9A of the Crimes Act 1961. 
This protects against unauthorised intrusions into personal space. In particular, it is a crime to make 
an intimate visual recording of another person.45  
With these sources in mind, the individual elements of Whata J's formulation will now be 
considered.  
B Intentional and Unauthorised Intrusion 
The first question when examining Whata J's formulation of the tort is how courts should 
develop the first element of the tort, "intentional and unauthorised intrusion". This requirement is 
taken from the summary of the United States' tort in Jones.46 In Holland, Whata J held that Mr 
Holland intentionally intruded when he videoed C in the shower "without her consent and otherwise 
without legislative authority".47 In order to develop this element of the tort, the courts will have to 
clarify what each of its key terms "intentional, "intrusion" and "unauthorised" means.  
"Intentional" means an affirmative act, not an accidental or careless act.48 Like other intentional 
torts such as battery, assault and false imprisonment, intention should not require knowledge that the 
intrusion was wrong; it should merely require intention to commit the act.49 Thus, a plaintiff should 
not be denied a remedy where the defendant mistakenly believes that he or she had lawful authority 
or the plaintiff's consent to intrude. 
It then follows that the term "intrusion" requires the plaintiff to identify a positive act committed 
by the defendant. Whata J did not explain what kinds of acts are "intrusions". Tugendhat & 
Christie's The Law of Privacy and the Media50 provides a useful starting point. It identifies 
  
43  The news media are largely exempt from the Privacy Act 1993 because the definition of "agency" in s 2 
excludes any news medium in relation to "news activities". "News activities" include the preparation and 
public dissemination of programmes concerning news or observations on news, including current affairs and 
consumer affairs shows and publications. 
44  Hosking v Runting [2003] 3 NZLR 385 (HC) at [97]. 
45  Crimes Act 1961, s 126H. 
46  Jones v Tsige, above n 30, at [56]. 
47  C v Holland, above n 2, at [99].  
48  C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
49  Such a view is also shared, but for different reasons, by Stephen Penk and Rosemary Tobin "The New 
Zealand tort of invasion of privacy: Future directions" (2011) 19 TLJ 191 at 208.  
50  Warby, Moreham and Christie, above n 17. 
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recording private conversations, covertly filming people without their permission, taking 
photographs with long-lensed cameras, stalking people, pursuing people for interviews and 
obtaining confidential documents as potentially intrusive acts in the news media context.51 
"Unauthorised" means that there is no consent to the intrusion or that the intrusion is not 
authorised by law.52 Whata J did not have to fully consider the meaning of unauthorised in the case 
because it was clear that C did not consent to the filming, nor was Mr Holland legally authorised to 
film.  
It is useful to look to the United States jurisprudence and New Zealand's privacy legislation to 
work out what "consent to the intrusion" means. Consent is a defence to an intrusive act in the 
United States tort,53 a defence to a charge under s 216G of the Crimes Act, and can mitigate a 
complaint under principle 4(b)(i) of the Privacy Act. The Crimes Act and Privacy Act require 
informed consent. For the purposes of Principle 4(b)(i), if the consent was induced by impersonation 
it will still amount to an unreasonable intrusion.54 Similarly, consent to a charge of making intimate 
visual recording requires that the person in the recording be of sufficient age and competence to 
appreciate the nature of the defendant's conduct.55 It would be consistent with this jurisprudence 
then to remove the term "unauthorised" from first element of the intrusion tort and replace it with 
the defences of "informed consent" and "lawful authority". This would shift the onus of proof to the 
defendant, which is desirable because defendants will often be in a better position to point to 
evidence of consent or lawful authority if this is what induced them to commit the intrusive act in 
the first place. 
C Into Seclusion 
The next element of Whata J's formulation of the intrusion tort is "[i]nto seclusion (namely 
intimate personal activity, space or affairs)".56 This element is taken from the Restatement, which 
reads: "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns".57 Whata J 
explained that "not every intrusion into a private matter is actionable"58 and that the "reference to 
intimate personal activity acknowledges the need to establish intrusion into matters that most 
  
51  Moreham, above n 17, at [2.16]. 
52  C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
53  William L Prosser "Privacy" (1960) 48(3) CLR 383 at 419. 
54  See Case No 14824 [1997] NZPrivCmr 14.  
55  Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Offences and Defences (online looseleaf ed, Brookers). 
56  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
57  Restatement, above n 28, § 652B. 
58  C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
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directly impinge on personal autonomy".59 He later said: "Mr Holland intruded into C's intimate 
space and activity when he videoed her in the shower".60 Little guidance was given as to the scope 
of the term "seclusion". All that can be ascertained from the case is that a person's private bathroom 
is an area of "seclusion". 
So, what might Whata J mean by "seclusion"? The Restatement provides a useful starting point. 
It states that the physical intrusion must occur in a place where plaintiffs have "secluded" their 
person or things.61 For example, plaintiffs are secluded when they are in spaces such as their home, 
or when recovering in a hospital room.62 Plaintiffs are not secluded when in public.63 Consistent 
with this, plaintiffs have been denied recovery when the news media filmed a suspect of a crime in 
the publicly accessible hallways of the sheriff's department,64 filmed into the interior of a shop from 
outside the storefront window,65 filmed a person walking from his house to his car,66 and pursued 
an interview with a company president in the public space outside the company's building.67 
However, the fact that someone is in public has not always defeated a plaintiff's claim. For 
example there was an actionable intrusion in a public space when a member of the press took a 
photograph of a young woman whose skirt had blown over her head revealing her underwear.68 
This case shows that the courts will sometimes take a normative approach, rather than a locational 
approach, when deciding whether an intrusion has occurred. The normative approach looks to the 
specific circumstances of the case and asks: would fairness and justice dictate that the plaintiff ought 
to succeed?  
Whata J's formulation appears to require both a locational and a normative inquiry. The second 
requirement of his formulation asks: is the plaintiff in a state of "seclusion"?69 This is a locational 
inquiry. The third requirement asks: does the intrusion involve "infringement of a reasonable 
  
59  C v Holland, above n 2, at [95]. 
60  C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
61  Restatement, above n 28, § 652B comment (b). 
62  Restatement, above n 28, § 652B comment (b). 
63  Restatement, above n 28, § 652B comment (c). 
64  Haynik v Zimlich 508 NE 2d 195 (Ohio 1986). 
65  Mark v Seattle Times 635 P 2d 1081 (Wash 1981). 
66  Aisenson v American Broadcasting Company 220 Cal App 3d 146 (Cal 1990). 
67  Machleder v Diaz 538 F Supp 1364 (SD NY 1982). 
68  Daily Times Democrat v Graham 162 So 2d 474 (Ala 1964). 
69  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
 THE NEW INTRUSION TORT: THE NEWS MEDIA EXPOSED? 89 
 
 
 
expectation of privacy"?70 This is a normative inquiry. In developing this mixed 
locational/normative approach, Whata J seems to have been influenced by Shulman v Group W 
Productions (Shulman), a leading United States media intrusion case.71 The plaintiffs in Shulman 
were a mother and a son who had been in a serious car accident. The defendants produced a 
documentary programme that followed first respondents to emergency scenes. The defendants sent a 
cameraman along to the scene of the plaintiff's accident to gather footage and audio recordings of 
the paramedics rescuing the plaintiffs from the accident. The plaintiffs sued for intrusion of privacy. 
In this case the Californian Supreme Court set out a two-stage test to work out whether there has 
been an intrusion upon the seclusion of another.72 First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
"penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to 
data about, the plaintiff"; ie the locational inquiry.73 Secondly, the plaintiff must have had a 
"reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data source"; ie the 
normative inquiry.74 
But is it desirable to require both a locational and normative inquiry? The locational analysis 
might provide an additional hurdle for recovery in order to ensure that only deserving plaintiffs who 
suffer from truly invasive intrusions can recover. Yet this strict locational analysis has attracted 
much criticism. While location will always play a part in the analysis of whether the defendant has 
breached the plaintiff's privacy, other factors can also be relevant.75 It is suggested then that future 
courts should not take a purely locational approach to this matter. 
This is principally because the strict locational requirement fails to uphold the interests that the 
tort protects. Shulman illustrates the failure of the locational requirement to uphold the dignitary 
interest of the tort. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that their right to privacy was intruded upon: 
(1) when the cameraman filmed the accident scene; (2) when accompanied by reporters in the 
helicopter that took them to hospital; and (3) when their conversations were recorded through 
microphones attached to the rescuers. The Court allowed claims (2) and (3) because there was an 
interest in seclusion in the interior of the helicopter and only unaided ears could hear the 
conversations recorded at those times.76 But the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there 
  
70  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94]. 
71  Shulman v Group W Productions 955 P 2d 469 (Cal 1998). 
72  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 490. 
73  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 490. 
74  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 490. 
75  See Nicole Moreham "Private Matters: A Review of the Broadcasting Standards Authority" (New Zealand 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, 2009) at 12–13; and Chris DL Hunt "Privacy in the Common Law: A 
Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeal's Decision in Jones v Tsige" (2012) 37 Queen's LJ 665 at 
686–688.  
76  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 491. 
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was an interest in seclusion in the accident scene itself.77 This was because the accident happened 
on a public road. Yet what was visible to members of the public from the road was actually no 
different in intimacy and character to what happened in the helicopter. The Court's reasoning here 
shows a failure to understand that it was not the location of the intrusion that determined whether 
the plaintiffs' dignity had been undermined. Rather, the plaintiffs' dignity was undermined because 
they were filmed while in a vulnerable state.78 The filming had turned the plaintiffs' suffering into a 
spectacle.79  
Similar criticism can be made in the BSA context. In TVNZ v Davies, TVNZ had filmed the 
complainant while he was collecting scallops. The complainant was unsuccessful in his intrusion 
claim because he was publicly visible from a little-travelled roadway.80 In finding that the plaintiff's 
activities were "public" on the basis that he was visible to people generally, the BSA failed to come 
to grips with the fact that what is "public" is a matter of degree. The complainant was only in 
"public" in the sense that a small group of people could actually see him. Broadcasting the footage 
on national television makes the activity "public" on a much larger scale.81 
An additional argument against the use of a location-based inquiry is that it is notoriously 
difficult to define "seclusion" based purely on location. To do so would be an oversimplification that 
could potentially lead to injustice.82 Gleeson CJ in ABC v Lenah Meats (quoted in Hosking) 
reasoned that, while the term "public" is a convenient tool to draw a line between what is private 
and what is not, the reality is that an activity is not private purely because it does not occur in 
public.83 A locational definition of privacy also fails to recognise that most people understand 
privacy to be a subjective concept.84 For example, one person may believe that her income is an 
intensely private matter, another may boast about his income to anybody who will listen.85 
The strict locational requirement is also out of step with current New Zealand law. The 
"seclusion" element of Whata J's test is similar to the term "private facts" from the first limb of the 
Hosking tort. When applying the first limb of the Hosking tort, the courts do not engage in two 
  
77  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 490. 
78  See discussion in NA Moreham "Privacy in Public Places" [2006] NZLJ 265 at 267–268. 
79  See a critical discussion of the decision in Shulman v Group W Productions in Hunt, above n 75, at 680. 
80  Davies v Television New Zealand (3 June 2005) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2005-017 at [20]. 
81  Moreham, above n 75, at 11. 
82  Hunt, above n 75, at 685. 
83  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats [2001] HCA 63; (2001) 185 ALR 1 at [42]. 
84  Nicole Moreham "Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis" (2005) 121 LQR 
628 at 641.  
85  This example is taken from Moreham, above n 84.  
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separate inquiries, where (hypothetically) the first would look to whether there are "facts" that are 
private (in the sense that they are known to only a limited number of people), and the second would 
consider whether there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in those facts. Rather, the courts 
determine whether "facts" are private by analysing whether there was a "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" that renders them private.86 Tipping J's alternative formulation of the tort in his concurring 
judgment did not even use the term "private facts". He believed that information becomes "private" 
either from the nature of the information or the circumstances that the defendant came into the 
information, not based on how many people are aware of the information.87  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has indicated that the exceptional circumstances of a case may 
qualify the general rule that a person has no right to privacy in public.88 BSA Principle 3(3) also 
recognises that the public place exemption does not apply where the plaintiff is particularly 
vulnerable.89  
Lastly, the New Zealand experience shows that the locational inquiry does little analytical work. 
BSA Principle 3 requires there to be an interference with the plaintiff's interest in "seclusion". In 
Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, Harrison J defined "seclusion" as a zone of "screening off or shutting 
off from the outside access or public view".90 But when determining whether the plaintiff was in a 
state of seclusion, he asked the normative question: did the plaintiff have a "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" in that zone?91 Subsequent decisions have followed Harrison J's approach.92 This 
approach is undesirable because it creates uncertainty in Principle 3's application by failing to 
specify how this locational requirement should be dealt with in future cases. 
So for all these reasons, it would be undesirable for future courts to take a locational approach to 
the seclusion requirement. Instead, it should be replaced by a single "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" test that would import a normative inquiry into whether plaintiffs "ought" to expect that 
their activities are private.  
  
86  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [164]. In Hosking v Runting, Gault P and Blanchard J held that the 
photographs of the Hosking twins in New Idea! magazine did not publicise facts to which there were a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
87  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [249]. 
88  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [164]. See also comments made by Anderson J in the same judgment at 
[271]. 
89  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3). 
90  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY [2008] NZAR 1 (HC) at [42]. 
91  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [44]–[45].  
92  See for example Television New Zealand Ltd v KW HC Auckland CIV-2007-485-1609, 18 December 2008 
at [65]. 
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D Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
So, if there is to be no strict locational requirement then how should the courts develop the 
reasonable expectation of privacy element? Whata J included this element in order to achieve 
consistency with the existing Hosking tort.93 He concluded that when Mr Holland videoed C in the 
shower it infringed her reasonable expectation of privacy.94 Because Whata J did not discuss this 
requirement in detail, it is necessary to consider how this requirement works. 
It is suggested that a broad, contextual approach should establish whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This would be similar to the approach taken by the United 
Kingdom Court of Appeal in the breach of confidence context.95 Relevant considerations would 
include: (i) the location of the intrusion; (ii) the purpose for which the plaintiff is in that location; 
(iii) the nature of the plaintiff's activity; (iv) the method of intrusion; (v) any indication that the 
plaintiff does not agree to the intrusion; and (vi) the impact of the intrusion on the plaintiff. Each of 
these considerations will be explained below.  
Although this article has argued that an approach based purely on location is problematic, the 
location where the intrusion takes place is an important consideration. In the United States, a 
plaintiff will always have a reasonable expectation of privacy at home,96 or in a place with restricted 
public access, such as a workplace.97 The BSA has taken a similar approach. A complainant's right 
of ownership or possession in the location will inform whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.98 Thus, complainants have a reasonable expectation of privacy when filmed by a hidden 
camera while opening their front doors,99 in the waiting areas of a business that operated inside a 
house,100 when taking photographs of models in their own homes,101 when carrying out 
  
93  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
94  C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
95  In Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 at [36] the English Court of 
Appeal formulated the following test to establish whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in an action of breach of confidence: 
As we see it, the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one which takes 
account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the 
activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of 
the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, the effect on the 
claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came to the publisher. 
96  Dietemann v Time Inc 449 F 2d 245 (9th Cir 1971). 
97  Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies Inc 978 P 2d 67 (Cal 1999). 
98  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [42]. 
99  Television New Zealand Ltd v KW, above n 92, at [62]–[63]. 
100  Television New Zealand Ltd v KW, above n 92, at [64]–[65]. 
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employment duties inside a house that belongs to someone else,102 and on their properties when 
they are not at home.103 However, it is important to note that the public interest defence will remove 
the expectation of privacy if the individual is doing something criminal in these private places.  
Whether the plaintiff is in a public place is not, however, determinative. In Andrews v TVNZ 
(Andrews) the plaintiffs, who brought their claim under the Hosking tort, were held to have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when they were filmed being rescued from their cars following an 
accident on a public road.104 But if the plaintiff is in a public location, it should certainly militate 
against finding an expectation of privacy. 
The consideration of the purpose for which the plaintiff is in the location where the intrusion 
takes place contemplates whether the plaintiff has retreated somewhere to escape from the public 
gaze. If so, it will point towards a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The nature of the plaintiff's activity should also be borne in mind. If the plaintiff is carrying out 
an intimate activity, for example toileting or engaging in sexual activity, then this should enhance 
the plaintiff's expectation of privacy. 
Sometimes the activity is so intimate that the location where the intrusion occurs is irrelevant. 
Support for this can be found in s 216G of the Crimes Act 1961. Section 216G(1)(a) makes it a 
crime to make a visual recording of another without his or her knowledge or consent when that 
person is in a place where he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and is either naked, 
engaging in sexual activity or is showering, toileting or undressing. Section 216G(1)(b) makes it a 
crime to make a visual recording of a person's intimate body parts from beneath his or her clothing 
or through his or her outer clothing. In s 216G(1)(b), a reasonable expectation of privacy is not a 
specific requirement. It seems that the circumstances covered by s 216G(1)(b) are so intimate that it 
is assumed that a person will have an expectation of privacy.  
The same should go where the plaintiff is in a particularly vulnerable situation. BSA Privacy 
Principle 3 states that, in general, a person does not have an interest in seclusion when in public,105 
but recognises that this public place exemption does not apply where the complainant is 
vulnerable.106 In CD v TV3 Network Services (CD) the complainant was filmed being extracted 
from her car following an accident, which was broadcast on a comedy show called "Ice As". The 
  
101  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [44] and [48]. 
102  CP v TVWorks Ltd (19 December 2012) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2012-069. 
103  Balfour v TVNZ (21 March 2006) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2005-129. 
104  Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd [2009] 1 NZLR 220 (HC) at [66]. 
105  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(2). 
106  Broadcasting Standards Authority Privacy Principle 3(3).  
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broadcast breached Principle 3 because the complainant was traumatised and bleeding from a head 
wound.107 
The method of intrusion should be relevant. Where the defendant needs to use a hidden camera, 
covert recording device, telescopic lens, or other surreptitious means to intrude upon the plaintiff's 
activity, this will indicate that the plaintiff did not intend for the activity to be public, and will 
consequently point towards a reasonable expectation of privacy. The BSA has held that surreptitious 
filming with a hidden camera will almost always be an intrusion.108  
However, where the plaintiffs are aware of cameras, recording devices or the defendant's mere 
presence, and go about their business regardless, this will point against the finding of an expectation 
of privacy. In the BSA decision in BQ and CR v TVNZ Ltd a couple, who were shown bidding on a 
house during a reality TV show, were unsuccessful in their intrusion claim because they were aware 
of the presence of cameras.109 
Where plaintiffs have made it clear that they want to be left alone, this may enhance the 
expectation. Another reason why the complainant in CD was successful was because the cameraman 
continued to film the complainant long after she had requested him to stop.110 
Lastly, where the defendant acts in a way that is distressing to the plaintiff, then this should aid 
the finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Hosking, Anderson J believed that if there was 
an element of embarrassment or distress involved in taking the photographs of the children on the 
public street then that might have been enough to decide the case differently.111 He discussed Peck 
v United Kingdom, a decision of the European Court of Human Rights, where the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in CCTV footage that recorded him attempting to commit 
suicide.112 A similar approach was taken in the BSA decision in CD where the complainant was 
ridiculed during the broadcast for her behaviour following the car-crash. The BSA found that the 
broadcast reached a point where it became "so offensive and intrusive as to constitute a form of 
harassment".113  
  
107  CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd (12 October 2000) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2000-141–143. 
108  See Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [54]; O'Connell v TVWorks Ltd (25 June 2008) 
Broadcasting Standards Authority 2007-067 at [68]; and CP v TVWorks Ltd, above n 102. 
109  BQ and CR v Television New Zealand (28 November 2002) Broadcasting Standards Authority 2002-193–
196 at [47]. 
110  CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 107. 
111  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [271]. 
112  Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
113  CD v TV3 Network Services Ltd, above n 107. 
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E Highly Offensive 
The final element of Whata J's test is that the intrusion is "highly offensive to a reasonable 
person". This is also adopted from the test in Hosking.114 This element ensures that defendants are 
not liable for trivial breaches of privacy.115 Only distressing breaches are protected.116 Whata J 
acknowledged that this element of the Hosking test had been subject to criticism, but he believed 
that the offensiveness element was preferable to a one-step reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.117 He felt that the one-step test was not sufficiently defined. This is a problem because 
intrusion cases will often involve balancing competing freedoms, thus judges need clear boundaries 
for intervention.118 Whata J then went on to say that the "highly offensive" test was satisfied in the 
case without any further explanation.119 It is suggested, however, that the criticisms of the high 
offensiveness test are well founded. This section therefore argues that the offensiveness test does 
little analytical work and fails to protect the plaintiff's dignity and should, therefore, be abandoned.  
First, the highly offensive test is of little analytical significance because it overlaps with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy element. Judges have expressed such a view in the context of the 
publicity tort. In Hosking, Tipping J felt that offensiveness is generally implicit in any finding that 
an expectation of privacy is reasonable.120 William Young P in the Court of Appeal decision in 
TVNZ v Rogers noted that, in most cases, publicity will be highly offensive because it breaches a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.121 Commenting on this qualifier in New Zealand's publicity tort, 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission has said that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test is enough to bar trivial claims brought by overly sensitive plaintiffs.122 
The lack of analytical significance is also evident in the BSA complaints process. Privacy 
Principle 3 requires the BSA to apply an objective test to determine whether an ordinary person 
would find the intrusion offensive. But in most cases offensiveness follows automatically from a 
finding of an intrusion upon a space where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.123 Judges 
  
114  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
115  Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 at [94]. 
116  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [126]. 
117  C v Holland, above n 2, at [97]. 
118  C v Holland, above n 2, at [97]. 
119  C v Holland, above n 2, at [99]. 
120  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [256]–[259]. 
121  Television New Zealand v Rogers [2007] 1 NZLR 156 (CA) at [122]. 
122  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Invasion of Privacy (NSWLRC R 120, 2009) at [5.9]. 
123  See for example Television New Zealand Ltd v KW, above n 92, at [55]–[61]. 
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often give no reasons why the intrusion is highly offensive because the requirement entails a value 
judgment for which it is difficult to provide clear reasons.124  
Both of New Zealand's privacy torts have taken the "highly offensive" test from the 
Restatement.125 The best articulation of this element in the United States intrusion context is found 
in Miller v National Broadcasting Company (Miller), where the Court held that in order to ascertain 
offensiveness, courts must consider: (1) the degree of the intrusion; (2) the context; (3) the 
circumstances surrounding the intrusion; (4) the motives and objectives of the intruder; (5) the 
setting into which he or she intrudes; and (6) the expectations of the persons whose privacy is 
invaded.126 Yet the determining factors for "offensiveness" in Miller are almost the exact same 
considerations found in the reasonable expectation of privacy test that this article suggests the courts 
should adopt. Factor (1), the degree of intrusion, will consider the impact of the intrusion on the 
plaintiff. Factor (2), the context, will examine the nature of the activity the plaintiff is engaged in. 
Factor (3), the circumstances, will look to the method of the intrusion. Factor (5), the setting, will 
focus on the location of the intrusion. Factor (6), the expectations of the person whose privacy is 
invaded, will consider any indications that the person did not want the intrusion to take place and 
the reason why the plaintiff is at the location.  
It follows that there is no need to include the highly offensive limb to develop the tort in line 
with the United States jurisprudence because it does the same work as the recommended reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. The one consideration from Miller that might not be covered by the 
recommended test is factor (4), the motives and objectives of the intruder. But this consideration is 
already covered in New Zealand by the "legitimate public concern" defence, which is discussed 
below. 
The danger of including a test that has little analytical significance is that it results in the 
"offensiveness" element becoming very difficult to apply, which creates unacceptable uncertainty. 
This is particularly so when Whata J does not give guidance as to how "offensiveness" is to be 
objectively ascertained. For example, is it offensive from the perspective of a reasonable person in 
the plaintiff's shoes?127 There is a danger that the resulting uncertainty will deter deserving 
claimants from bringing complaints or could have an undesirable chilling effect on broadcasters' 
newsgathering methods. 
Another criticism of the highly offensive test is that its application has failed to protect the 
plaintiff's dignity in the publication tort context. In Andrews, a documentary crew filmed the victims 
  
124  Moreham, above n 75, at 15. 
125  Restatement, above n 28, §§ 652B and 652D. 
126  Miller v National Broadcasting Company 187 Cal App 3d 1463 (Cal 1987) at 679. 
127  This is how Nicholson J applied the test in the publicity tort decision in P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC).  
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of a car accident. The footage was screened on national television. Allan J declined the plaintiffs' 
claim on the basis that there was nothing that showed them in a bad light or that was 
embarrassing.128 However, Allan J's reasoning failed to recognise that the highly offensive test 
exists to ensure relief is given only for breaches that cause real humiliation and distress. Although 
the plaintiffs were not portrayed in a negative way, they were filmed in a very intimate situation 
where they were hurt, afraid and vulnerable. This was an affront to their dignity that resulted in real 
humiliation when the documentary was broadcast.129  
In Rogers v TVNZ, Elias CJ raised Lord Nicholls criticism of the "highly offensive" test.130 He 
said that it gave an unwarranted weight to an unqualified freedom of expression over the right to 
privacy.131 Thus, by adding an additional hurdle to recovery, the highly offensive test will often fail 
to protect plaintiffs even when their dignity is severely undermined.  
The above criticisms suggest that the "offensiveness" limb should be not be relied on in future 
intrusion cases.  
F Legitimate Public Concern 
After setting out his formulation, Whata J mentioned that liability could be subject to a defence 
of legitimate public concern.132 He did not explain how this defence works because the facts did not 
require any consideration of it. This gives rise to questions about how the legitimate public concern 
defence will be applied. The Hosking tort, BSA decisions and United States case law can provide 
some answers.  
The legitimate public concern defence is taken from the Hosking tort. Gault P and Blanchard J 
were concerned that the scope of the privacy tort might limit freedom of expression beyond that 
which is justified in a free and democratic society.133 It is necessary to distinguish matters that are 
of legitimate concern to the public from those which are merely interesting to the public on a human 
level.134 Where there is a legitimate public concern in the information publicised, this will be 
balanced proportionally against the harm likely to be caused by the breach of privacy.135 The more 
  
128  Andrews v Television New Zealand Ltd, above n 104, at [68]–[69]. 
129  Moreham, above n 7, at 242–243. 
130  Rogers v Television New Zealand Ltd [2007] NZSC 91, [2008] 2 NZLR 277 at [36]. 
131  Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, above n 115, at [134]. 
132  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. 
133  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [130]. 
134  TV3 Network Services Ltd v The Broadcasting Standards Authority [1995] 2 NZLR 720 at 733 cited in 
Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [133]. 
135  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [134]. 
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serious the likely harm caused, the less likely that the defendant's right to freedom of expression will 
prevail.136  
A similar defence is enshrined in Privacy Principle 8, which allows a media defendant to breach 
a privacy principle where the breach discloses a matter of legitimate concern to the public. The BSA 
employs the same balancing test as in Hosking. It has recognised criminal matters, issues relating to 
public health and safety, matters of politics, government or public administration, matters relating to 
the conduct of organisations which impact on the public, exposing misleading claims made by 
individuals or organisations, and exposing antisocial and harmful conduct as all being of public 
concern.137 The defence is also not available to reporters who go on fishing expeditions with the 
hope of finding illegal or unprofessional conduct when there is no prior evidence that such conduct 
is occurring.138  
In general, the BSA has held that broadcasting footage taken from a hidden camera must be 
justified by exceptional circumstances because the recording of such footage will usually involve a 
substantive intrusion.139 Thus, in TV3 Network Services v Fahey (Fahey) the Court held that in the 
circumstances of the case, the obtaining of a surreptitious film, was an understandable pre-emptive 
course of action.140 The Fahey case concerned the granting of an injunction to stop the broadcast of 
footage obtained surreptitiously in order to expose that a well-known medical professional who was 
standing for the Christchurch mayoralty had engaged in sexual misconduct with his patients. The 
decision does not support any general proposition that the ends of newsgathering justify the 
means.141  
Care needs to be taken when drawing on the Hosking and BSA material because in all these 
decisions the courts and the Authority have had the information in front of them from which they 
can ascertain whether the legitimate public concern in the information trumps the likely harm 
caused. With intrusion, proceedings might be brought against a journalist well before publication of 
the information, and there is even a risk that information uncovered from the intrusion may not even 
  
136  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [134]. 
137  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [58]. 
138  In O'Connell v TVWorks Ltd, above n 108, the television show Target set up hidden cameras in a house and 
got an actress to portray an elderly woman in need of home support. It then hired a series of caregivers and 
covertly filmed them going about their jobs. This was not in the public interest because there was no 
indication that the caregivers were going to behave illegally or unprofessionally. 
139  Canwest TVWorks Ltd v XY, above n 90, at [54]; O'Connell v TVWorks Ltd, above n 108, at [68]; CP v 
TVWorks Ltd, above n 102.  
140  TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey [1999] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 135. 
141  TV3 Network Services Ltd v Fahey, above n 140, at 136. 
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turn out to be publishable. This makes it more difficult for a court to determine whether there was 
legitimate public concern that justified the intrusion.  
The United States approach to this issue has been to deny the existence of a public concern 
defence, but in some cases to consider newsgathering at the highly offensive stage. In Dietemann v 
Time Inc (Dietemann),142 the Court rejected the defendant's argument that it was immunised from 
liability under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution143 (which protects freedom of 
the press) because it was using the concealed recording tools for newsgathering. The Court found 
that newsgathering predates the invention of miniature cameras and recording devices, and those 
devices are not "indispensible tools" of newsgathering.144 The Court in Shulman, relying on 
Dietemann, rejected the defendants' argument that a newsgathering defence should be available 
against a claim for intrusion where the information is about a matter of legitimate concern to the 
public and the underlying conduct of gathering the information is lawful. It reasoned that freedom of 
expression would not be curtailed by refusing the media a general licence to intrude upon another's 
privacy on the off chance that it finds something worth publishing.145 Instead, the Court held that 
the discovery of socially important information might stop an intrusion from being highly 
offensive.146 
New Zealand courts should not adopt the United States approach of considering newsworthiness 
at the highly offensive stage. Rather, they should follow Whata J's suggestion that there be a defence 
of legitimate public concern and then tailor that defence so that it is suitable for the intrusion 
context.  
So how should this be done? The defence should be available where the intrusion took place for 
the pursuit of information that is of considerable public concern. This would also require that the 
information be obtained honestly through the use of the least intrusive means possible.  
  
142  In Dietemann v Time Inc, above n 96, the defendants were investigating "quack doctors" who were 
practising medicine illegally. Dietemann was one of these doctors. An undercover investigator for Life 
Magazine pretended to be a patient and attended an appointment with the Dietemann with a hidden audio 
recording device that transmitted the conversations between them to a police car parked outside Dietemann's 
home. These conversations outed Dietemann as a fraud. He brought a cause of action against the magazine's 
owner for intrusion upon seclusion. 
143  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the making of any law respecting an 
establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing 
on the freedom of the press, interfering with the right to peaceably assemble or prohibiting the petitioning 
for a governmental redress of grievances.  
144  Dietemann v Time Inc, above n 96, at 249.  
145  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 496–497. 
146  This approach taken in Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, was reaffirmed in the Californian 
Supreme Court's decision in Sanders v American Broadcating Companies Inc, above n 97. 
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The defence should be pitched at a higher standard than in the Hosking tort because media 
defendants should have to point to seriously legitimate reasons that justify intrusive newsgathering. 
The stronger requirement of "considerable" (as opposed to "legitimate") recognises that intrusion 
proceedings will often be invoked in situations where media defendants have intruded but have not 
found anything newsworthy. This appropriately balances the need to vindicate privacy rights against 
the need to safeguard deserving investigative reporting. Matters of considerable public concern 
would include situations where there is significant danger to health or safety, the detection and 
prevention of serious crime, exposure of matters that are of financial significance to the general 
public, and exposure of matters that could have a significant effect on government or public 
administration. For example, the intrusive investigation in Fahey would reach this threshold because 
it had a significant effect on public administration. The investigation had the potential to, and indeed 
did, show that the mayoral candidate had committed sexual improprieties during his medical career.  
The "honesty" requirement ensures that information is obtained in a way that does not involve 
exploitation of a person's vulnerabilities, coercion or other forms of improper pressure. This protects 
the dignity interest. Thus, the defence would not have been available to the defendants in Shulman 
because they took "calculated advantage of the plaintiffs' vulnerability and confusion" when 
recording the plaintiffs' conversations at the accident scene and when filming inside the 
ambulance.147 
The "least intrusive means" requirement limits the defence's availability to situations where 
intrusion is the only means through which the information can be obtained. In certain circumstances 
it will be necessary to make an audio or visual recording in order to prove that an activity of 
considerable public concern is occurring. This would cover situations like in Fahey where the 
surreptitious filming of the conversation between Dr Fahey and X, who made the allegations of 
sexual misconduct, was needed to protect X from Dr Fahey's attacks on the credibility of her 
allegations, especially after he had said, under oath, that she was mentally disordered.148  
IV  HOW SHOULD THE INTRUSION TORT INTERACT WITH 
THE PUBLICITY TORT? 
So far, this article has suggested that Whata J's formulation should develop to require an 
intentional intrusion that involves an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy in an 
activity, space or affairs, subject to a defence of considerable public concern, consent or lawful 
authorization. But, this leaves open an important question about how the intrusion tort should 
interact with the publicity tort. All that Whata J said about the relationship between the two torts is 
that they should remain consistent.149 Both the publication and intrusion torts require an invasion of 
  
147  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 494. 
148  TV3 Network Services v Fahey, above n 140, at 135. 
149  C v Holland, above n 2, at [94] and [96]. 
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a private sphere belonging to the plaintiff.150 The fundamental difference between them is that the 
intrusion tort does not require publication. It is therefore likely that plaintiffs will plead causes of 
action in both torts. This section will briefly consider how the courts might wish to develop the 
relationship between these two torts.  
The United States jurisprudence is useful because both torts have existed there for a number of 
years.151 Keith J in Hosking described the development of the publicity tort in the United States as: 
"[t]hat ridiculous mouse born of all that mountainous labour".152 This is because the "legitimate 
public concern" (or "newsworthiness") defence to the publicity tort allows news media defendants to 
escape liability in almost all cases because freedom of the press is heavily protected under the 
United States Constitution.153 When a plaintiff pleads both intrusion and publication of private facts 
in relation to the same string of acts, he or she may be successful in one tort, but unsuccessful in the 
other. This was evident in Shulman where the Court (at summary judgment) held that the plaintiffs 
had an arguable case in intrusion, but also threw out the publication tort claim because to allow a 
court to find the defendants liable would "assert impermissible supervisory powers over the 
press".154  
Yet it seems illogical that a court could be prepared to compensate a person for harm caused by 
an intrusion, but then would deny recovery for the harm caused by the subsequent publication of any 
material gathered from that same intrusion. This is unfair on plaintiffs because the courts fail to 
acknowledge that the news media's actions cause harm beyond the intrusion itself. Publication of 
private information has a humiliating effect on plaintiffs on a very public level, and failure to 
provide redress would undermine the dignitary interest of the tort. It is also unfair on the news 
media. While the courts acknowledge that the news media have a constitutional right to publish a 
story, this right comes at the price of damages for liability in tort. This is morally undesirable 
because the news media are paying for their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed 
right. This also rewards media defendants who are large enough to afford the litigation risk that 
comes with publishing private information because smaller media entities that cannot afford the 
litigation risk are locked out from publishing such information.  
Some have suggested that the creation of a compendious tort, which would cover both intrusions 
and publicity given to private facts, could solve the problems resulting from the inconsistency 
  
150  Prosser, above n 53, at 407. 
151  The Restatement, above n 28, § 652D identifies the elements of the publication of private facts tort action, 
the text of which can be found at Appendix 4. 
152  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [216]. 
153  Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky "Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do 
About It" (1998) 73 Tul L Rev 173 at 199–200. 
154  Shulman v Group W Productions, above n 71, at 497. 
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between the two torts in application.155 Other commentators have suggested that the formulation of 
a single tort would be unmanageable given the different interests that the intrusion tort and the 
publicity tort vindicate.156  
 A middle ground would, however, be better. Courts should, therefore, negotiate a path between 
the United States approach and the formulation of a compendious tort. In order to do this, both torts 
should be maintained, but plaintiffs should be precluded from pleading the intrusion tort where there 
has been publication of private facts gathered as a result of an intrusion. Instead, the plaintiff's only 
cause of action should be the Hosking tort. This would not result in a failure to vindicate a plaintiff's 
interest in seclusion. This is because the courts should still consider whether defendants have used 
intrusive methods in order to obtain the private information that was published. Tipping J in 
Hosking said that the circumstances through which the defendant comes into possession of the 
information is one method of finding a reasonable expectation of privacy.157 So if intrusive methods 
have been used, then this will assist the plaintiff's claim in the publicity tort. The United Kingdom 
breach of confidence case, Murray v Big Pictures Ltd, illustrates this approach. The defendant took 
a photograph of author JK Rowling and her husband pushing their infant down a street in a buggy. 
The nature of the intrusion was relevant to establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
photographs. Sir Anthony Clarke MR emphasised that the pictures had been taken deliberately and 
surreptitiously to be published for a profit and there was no doubt that the parents would have 
objected to such photos.158  
If plaintiffs are successful in the publication tort, then the damages awarded should compensate 
for the harms caused by both the intrusion and the subsequent publication. This recognises that two 
separate breaches of privacy have occurred. 
  
155  See, for example, Skoien DCJ's decision in Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 at [444] where the judge 
ambitiously created a common law privacy tort to cover all manner of invasions that included the following 
elements:  
(a)  a willed act by the defendant, 
(b)  which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff, 
(c)  in a manner which could be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, 
(d)  and which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental psychological or emotional harm or 
distress or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from doing an act which she is lawfully entitled to do.  
156  See Penk and Tobin, above n 49, at 251–252; and also Daniel Solove "Conceptualising Privacy" (2002) 90 
CLR 1087 at 1130.  
157  Hosking v Runting, above n 3, at [249]. 
158  Murray v Express Newspapers plc, above n 95, at [50]. 
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V CONCLUSION 
Whata J's bold decision in Holland to recognise the intrusion tort as part of New Zealand's 
common law was a significant step forward for the protection of individual privacy rights. However, 
the decision poses more questions than it answers. This article has discussed how the courts should 
develop the intrusion tort to balance individual privacy rights against the media's important 
newsgathering functions. In future, the courts need to give greater consideration to the precise 
meaning of the words in the tort's formulation so that it can protect the rights that the tort was 
designed to vindicate and ensure that Whata J's bold decision lives up to its potential. 
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VI APPENDIX ONE: BROADCASTING STANDARDS 
AUTHORITY PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
Privacy Principle 3 
(1) It is inconsistent with an individual's privacy to allow the public disclosure of material 
obtained by intentionally interfering, in the nature of prying, with that individual's interest 
in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be highly offensive to an objective reasonable 
person.  
(2) In general, an individual's interest in solitude or seclusion does not prohibit recording, 
filming, or photographing that individual in a public place ('the public place exemption').  
(3) The public place exemption does not apply when the individual whose privacy has been 
allegedly infringed was particularly vulnerable, and where the disclosure is highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person.  
Privacy Principle 8 
Disclosing the matter in the 'public interest', defined as of legitimate concern or interest to the 
public, is a defence to a privacy complaint.  
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VII APPENDIX TWO: CRIMES ACT 1961 
216G Intimate visual recording defined 
(1) In sections 216H to 216N, intimate visual recording means a visual recording (for 
example, a photograph, videotape, or digital image) that is made in any medium using 
any device without the knowledge or consent of the person who is the subject of the 
recording, and the recording is of— 
(a) a person who is in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be 
expected to provide privacy, and that person is— 
(i) naked or has his or her genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female 
breasts exposed, partially exposed, or clad solely in undergarments; 
or 
(ii) engaged in an intimate sexual activity; or 
(iii) engaged in showering, toileting, or other personal bodily activity 
that involves dressing or undressing; or 
(b) a person's naked or undergarment-clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or 
female breasts which is made— 
(i) from beneath or under a person's clothing; or 
(ii) through a person's outer clothing in circumstances where it is 
unreasonable to do so. 
(2) In section 216H, intimate visual recording includes an intimate visual recording 
that is made and transmitted in real time without retention or storage in— 
(a) a physical form; or 
(b) an electronic form from which the recording is capable of being reproduced 
with or without the aid of any device or thing. 
216H Prohibition on making intimate visual recording 
Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who intentionally or 
recklessly makes an intimate visual recording of another person. 
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VIII APPENDIX THREE PRIVACY ACT 1993 
6 Information privacy principles 
The information privacy principles are as follows: 
… 
Principle 4 
Manner of collection of personal information 
Personal information shall not be collected by an agency –  
(a) by unlawful means; or 
(b) by means that, in the circumstances of the case, –  
(i) are unfair; or 
(ii)  intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the individual 
concerned. 
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IX APPENDIX FOUR: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
(1977) 
§ 652A 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting 
harm to the interests of the other.  
(2) The right to privacy is invaded by  
(a)  unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in 652B; or; 
(b)  appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or  
(c)  unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in 652D; or 
(d)  publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated 
in 652E. 
§ 652B 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  
§ 652D 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability 
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that  
(a)  would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and  
(b)  is not of legitimate concern to the public.  
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